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ABSTRACT
Elections, referenda and polls are vital processes for the
operation of a modern democracy. They form the
mechanism for transferring power from citizens to their
representatives. Although some commentators claim that
the pencil-and-paper systems used in countries such as
Canada and UK are still the best method of avoiding voterigging, recent election problems, and the need for faster,
better, cheaper vote counting, have stimulated great
interest in managing the election process through the use
of electronic voting systems. While computer scientists,
for the most part, have been warning of the possible perils
of such action, vendors have forged ahead with their
products, claiming increased security and reliability.
Many democracies have adopted electronic systems, and
the number of deployed systems is rising. Although the
electronic voting process has gained popularity and users,
it is a great challenge to provide a reliable system. The
existing systems available to perform the election tasks
are far from trustworthy. In this paper we describe VEV
(Verifiable E-Voting), an electronic voting system which
is opne, but also provides for secret and secure voting, and
can be used and verified over existing network system.
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1. Introduction
It is clearly desirable that the operation of our
governments be transparent: we need to have trust in the
work of our Nation State. In this paper we suggest that the
adoption of Free/Libre and Open Source Software
(FLOSS) as the primary software resource for key
government responsibilities to ensure transparency and
trust in such systems, in particular the electoral system,. In
this paper we present a Verifiable Electronic Voting
system that we have developed and released as FLOSS.
[9]
Today, nearly every government in the world wants to
know more about free software and how the model works,
and the private sector is not far behind. Some
governments have already begun the task of migrating to
the use of free software in the public sector. The free
GNU/Linux operating system now rivals the dominance

of Microsoft Windows in controlling how our computers
and networks run, at least at an institutional level. For
example, the Australian Government Information
Management Office’s (AGIMO) recognises that the use of
open source software is “particularly widespread in areas
such as network infrastructure, single-purpose computer
servers, security, Internet and intranet applications and
network communications” in both the private and public
sectors. [10]
In Europe there has been a flurry of projects that are
addressing the possibility of widespread adoption of Free
Software. The FLOSS project (Free/Libre and Open
Source Software) [1] ran from June 2001 for 16 months. It
had European Commission funding to gather data on
FLOSS use and development. The project was looking to
find hard economic data on the effects of FLOSS
contributions as a “non-monetary economic network”, the
distribution patterns of such software, measuring
contribution and use, business models, particularly change
management.[2] The project was remarkable as the first of
its kind to collect such empirical data on a large scale on
FLOSS. Following FLOSS’s success at making an inroad
into providing data on FLOSS, further EU projects have
followed. FLOSS-POLS (Free/Libre/Open Source
Software: Policy Support) [3] is a current project funded
by the European Commission to analyse “government
policy towards open source; gender issues in open source;
and the efficiency of open source as a system for
collaborative problem-solving…. [and] focus on studying
the impact of policy and providing policy
recommendations.”[4] By March 2005, FLOSS-POLS had
surveyed 4,138 public authority IT administrators in 13
European member states (excluding Hungary). The key
outcomes of this survey are that they found 79% of those
surveyed used some FLOSS, and that there is a desire for
increased use amongst them. Also notable is the different
countries showed different profiles.
An electronic voting system provides the means for the
election authorities to carry out the election process using
computer-based technology. Although it brings ease to the
voters and election candidates, computer scientists argue
that voting on line is not safe, because the network,
operating system, access, ore even hardware may have
security flaws. [5] There has been very little in the way of
workable voting system code release as FLOSS.

Many voters already use some sort of computerized voting
system. [6] Punch cards, like the ones used in USA
presidential elections in 2000, are tallied by a
computerized counting machine that detects the punched
holes in a ballot. This form of voting has been used since
the 1960’s [7]. Optical scanners are used for those voting
systems that use paper and pen, to detect pen marks made
on a ballot. Optical scan vote counters are not as old as
punch card technology, but they seem somewhat archaic
compared to other technologies that we use everyday. For
many people, an electronic voting is the next logical step
for elections.
In Brazil and the Netherlands, many voters already use
ATM-like machines to cast their vote. Using these
machines, voters gather at their traditional voting precinct
and cast their ballots in a kiosk, just like the one they have
always used. This kiosk retains the privacy that voters
want. Voters carry in a cartridge and place it in the evoting computer, which displays the candidates on a
touch-screen, liquid-crystal display. Unlike paper ballots,
these machines display information about each candidate
aside from their party affiliation, and might even display
the candidate's photo so that there is less confusion over
identity. A voter makes his choice by touching the screen.
Once the voter has completed the ballot, the computer
allows the voter to review his or her choice before
returning the cartridge to an election official.
In an electronic voting process voters can simply point
and click on the candidate they support. This type of
voting has the potential to significantly increase voter
turnout. In 1998, only 44.9 percent of Americans of voting
age took the time to vote. According to [3] many nonvoters say that the inconvenience of registering or voting
is the main reason they did not cast a ballot.
Dill in [2] points out that unless the voting process is
verifiable, it can not be trusted. In most of existing Direct
Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines the internal
mechanics of voting are hidden from the voter. It is
possible that a computer can easily display one set of
votes to the voter while recording entirely different votes
in electronic memory.
This can be caused by a
programming error or by a malicious design of the system.
Almost all of DRE machines currently used in USA
require official certification, but the election officers are
powerless to prevent programming errors in recording of
the votes. DRE code is usually protected by code secrecy
agreements, so no one but the manufacturer has access to
it. Dill et al. says that the only way to have a trusted
electronic voting system is to include a voter-verifiable
paper audit trail in all DRE voting machines. The voting
system that is described in this report provides a secure
way to count and to verify the votes.
While computer scientists and critics in North America
are concerned with the insecurity of electronic voting
machines, Australians designed a voting system five years

ago, and they made most of the source code of the
underlying software available to the public [ 8].The system
had to be implemented over a secure network (using
independent connections). This requirement alone
provides enormous difficulty to the election authorities in
Australia. The state was able to test only 80 machines
distributed among 8 polling stations in their 2002 election.

2. The Task
The design of a “good” voting system, whether electronic
or using traditional paper ballots or mechanical devices
must be robust against a wide variety of potentially
fraudulent behavior. The following voting system
requirements were born out of the desire to create a
product that would allow modern computer-based
technology to truly emulate the secure properties as
valued in the public voting. The purpose of this project is
to make it impossible for voting authorities to engage in a
fraudulent behaviour, and at the same time the system will
provide the secrecy for the voters. VEV has been an
attempt to provide a voting system that would be:
1.

anonymous - no one should be able to determine how
any individual voted
2. secret - all cast votes should be unknown until the
election ends
3. correct It should not be possible for a vote to be
altered, or for a valid vote to be eliminated from the
final tally, or for an invalid vote to be counted in the
final tally
4. honest no one should be able to vote twice or
change the vote of another voter
5. public after an election all results should
publicly known, but the connection between votes and
the voters should be both unprovable and unknown
Critics of the electronic voting systems say that the voters
who use them have no way to verify that their votes are
being recorded and counted accurately. In case of an
electronic system the only known solution to this problem
is to introduce a “voter-verifiable audit trail”. Most
commonly, this is achieved by adding a printer to the
voting terminal. When the voter finishes selecting
candidates, a ballot is printed on paper and presented to
the voter. If the printed ballot reflects the voter’s intent,
the ballot is saved for future reference [2].
The design of a VEV helps to overcome these difficulties.
In part, the system uses the idea introduced in [9]. It
provides a significant improvement to the process of
electronic voting by publishing the voting results to the
screen. The system does not involve printers or paper
receipts. Every user will be able to see the number of
votes that were cast and the final results for each
candidate, but only the particular user will know if his/her
vote was counted and if it was counted correctly.

3. The protocol
There have been a number of conditions that have to be
met in order to provide voters with a secure electronic
voting system. This paper includes the description of the
general steps that needed to be taken in the design of the
system to provide the user with voting security. The
requirements for the system are the following:
1. Voting takes place over a computer network
The electronic voting system is designed to be
implemented and used over an existing computer network.
The system includes three major parts: server’s side
program, client’s (voter) side application and
administrator’s (administrative user) side software. The
server-application should be stored and executed on the
main network computer. The client-application could be
located either on the main computer or on every network’s
terminal. It is recommended that, for the security reasons,
the administrator’s application should be stored on the
removable storage device (such as floppy, CD), kept
secure, and run only when changes are being made to the
voting procedure. The administrator’s software should be
used with extra caution.
2. Only authorized voters can vote
Every voter will be assigned a user’s name and a unique
password. The administrator will be responsible for
choosing the appropriate values for the name and
password, since it depends on the election importance as
well as the election settings, (e.g. students at the Computer
Science Department might be assigned departmental
user’s names and their students numbers as passwords; the
secret service workers can use randomly generated
numbers as their identification). The administrator has to
deliver the user’s names and passwords to each eligible
voter. It is up to the election administrators to decide what
means of delivery will be chosen (e-mail, regular mail, in
person). It is assumed that this is done in a very secure
way.
3. The voter can cast only one vote
It is important for the system that it allows each voter to
cast one and only one vote. It is required by the
democratic election process that there can not be more
votes cast than there are voters. This system will provide
the option of a re-vote to each user. Therefore it becomes
of great importance that the previous vote cast by the
particular voter will be erased when that user votes again.
4. Only the voter can know his/her vote
In democratic elections only the voter can know his voting
strategy: This is the secrecy requirement. There can not be
a trace left between the voter and the vote and all the links
should disappear. No one should be able to recognize the
voter by looking at the ballot.
5.

Each voter can check if his/her vote was counted

There is a great improvement to the electronic voting
process in VEV. Every user can check if his/her vote is in
the ballot (which means it has been counted). The system
will provide the option to check the votes (check the
ballot), and the voting strategy identification (discussed
below) will be displayed. Each user can count the votes
that were cast. He can recognize his vote among the
displayed votes.
6. Each voter can change his mind
When the election process progresses, the voter can
become aware that he did not vote for the candidate he
wanted. VEV provides the option to re-vote. It is assumed
the re-vote is available before the final voting date. The
user can change his mind multiple times. The system
supports a multiple re-vote function. Every time the new
vote is cast the existing vote from that user is erased.
The voting system that is described in this paper uses the
public-private key paradigm to encrypt information. In
VEV, the user’s identification number (id) and the voting
strategy number (v) (which is a numeral representation of
the candidate’s name) are the two prime numbers that are
being used. There are three different algorithms designed
to do calculations with these two prime numbers and
returning one large number as a result. It is randomly
chosen in the program which of the three algorithms is
used when the voting is performed.

4. The algorithms
Function 1:
First function uses multiplication function as the
underlying calculation. As a result, the product of two
prime numbers is returned.
Function 2:
This function calculates the product of two prime
numbers. It swaps the values of the individual bytes
within the binary representation of the product (namely
copies the value of last byte into the byte before the last,
and the value of the second last byte into the last byte. The
same swapping operation is done to the third and fourth
last byte of the product).
Function 3:
This function calculates the product of two prime
numbers. It flips (replaces with the complementary value)
the values of the individual bits within the binary
representation of the product. The algorithm changes the
values of bit positions: 3,6,7,12,15.
The fact that both of the prime numbers are randomly
generated for each user and for each voting strategy
provides enormous security for the system. The standard
RSA cryptosystem uses the same p and q throughout its
lifetime where in the voting system presented here the
probability that the same two numbers will be used twice
is very close to zero. The major part of the private key

constitutes the fact that there exists a system defined index
that uniquely identifies each candidate. Even if the
intruder is able to factor the voting strategy function
result, having two prime numbers would not give him any
reasonable answer. The secret lies in the knowledge of
indexing the candidates and having the function inverses.
For this particular reason the usage of 25-bit long prime
numbers provides sufficient security to the voting system.
The prime numbers are being generated using the
constructor for
BigInteger class from
the Java
programming language library. The method returns a
randomly chosen, 25-bit long positive integer which is a
prime number. The probability that the newly generated
number represents a prime number will exceed (1 1/2100). The execution time of this constructor is
proportional to the value of the probability parameter
(which in this case is 100). In addition, each newly created
number is checked once again by isPrime() function from
the Java class library.
In the remainder of this paper, the word user will be used
interchangeably with the word voter to describe the person
who is casting the vote. The word server will be used to
describe the software implemented and executed on the
network’s main computer and the word client constitutes
to the computer program that provides the graphical
interface to the user, and allows for communication
between the server and the voter.
Phase 1: Preparation
VEV (hereafter called system) publishes the number of
eligible voters and the deadline for the response. In order
to be able to vote, each voter has to confirm his intention
to vote and only those who respond will be allowed to cast
the vote later. There will be a specified period of time
when the voters can respond.
Phase 2: Voting Scenario
When the date for the user’s response passes, the system
enters the phase of the main voting process. The voting
system running on the server is constantly waiting for the
user to connect. The voter starts using the system by
entering his user name and the password which he
previously obtained from the system’s administrator. Then
the system authenticates the user. If the system recognizes
the user it makes all functionality available to this person
(such as vote, re-vote or view the existing votes). If the
voter is not a recognized person (either the user’s name or
the password does not match the records) he is treated as a
guest to the system and the only thing that he is able to
view are the existing votes. If the recognized user chooses
to cast the vote for the first time the system creates the
identification number for that user. When the eligible user
wants to cast a vote for the first time the client software
will randomly generate a 25-bit long prime number (id)
which will be used to uniquely identify that particular user
(that number has to be checked against existing
identification tags that have been stored already in the

server’s database; if such a number exists already, a new
identification tag is generated).
In the next step of casting a vote the user chooses the
candidate that he wants to vote for. The system displays
the names of the election candidates and the user chooses
one of them. The numerical encoding for every voting
strategy (e.g. name of candidate) is a large prime number.
VEV is able to handle as many as 24 candidates to be
voted for. The number 24 provides the opportunity for the
unique encryption of each voting strategy. First, all
numbers that end with 1,3,7,9 between 10 and 100 are
selected (the underlying reason for that is the fact that the
prime numbers end with 1, 3, 7, 9). This way a set of two
digit numbers has been created (hereafter called indexes).
For every index from the set, an election candidate is
assigned. When the user chooses to cast a vote for a
particular candidate, a random 25-bit prime number (v) is
generated such that the first digit is equal to the first digit
of the index and the last digit of v is the same as the last
digit of an index. E.g.: Say we have an election candidate
Anna S. Initially the system had assigned an index
identification number to her that is 51. If the voter decides
to cast the vote for Anna S. the client’s program will
randomly generate the prime number 5…..1 (first and last
digit match the index).
Next, the user sends the pair of integers (id, f (id, v)) to the
system where f is a randomly chosen encryption function
(one of three algorithms that are explained above); id is
the identification tag generated for the user, and v is the
candidate’s name represented in the number; f (id, v) is
the result of the encrypting method that takes id and v as
its parameters. The system does not know the connection
between the user’s name and the id tag (or the voting
strategy). The only association that is known to the system
is the connection between the id tag and the vote function
f (id, v). The user is asked to write down his identification
number (id) and the result of the voting strategy function.
He is also informed by the system to keep these numbers
secret. When the server’s side receives the numbers it
publishes the voting function result to the screen. The user
can easily check by choosing the Check Votes option if his
vote was counted.
For each election candidate the system displays f(id,v) to
the screen. This way the user can check the correctness of
his vote and the distribution of all votes. Publishing the
voting strategy will serve an additional function. Every
election candidate will be able to check if the votes were
counted correctly. It might be of a great importance for
the candidates, because it is known that the elections have
been won by a difference of several votes.

5. Implementation
The primary advantage of public-key cryptography is
increased security and convenience. The private key never

needs to be transmitted or revealed to anyone. This section
explains the major steps that have to be taken in order to
implement this voting system whose security is based on
the usage of public-private key paradigm. It has been
assumed that the server is running on the main computer
and is constantly waiting for a client to connect. It is also
anticipated that every user possesses the knowledge of his
user’s name and password. The italic type characters will
be used to indicate the processes occurring on the server’s
side of the voting system.

6. Main server’s functionality
Pseudo code:
//second phase: user can vote and re-vote
The system recognizes the user and chooses the
correct response depending on user’s input:
…
switch (state) {
case VOTE:// user wants to vote
create new Vote object
outLine = "User wants to vote";
os.println(outLine);
//check once more if the user can vote
while(true){
read the input from the client
get the id (prime) from the client’s system;
}
inString=is.readLine();
BigInteger t = new BigInteger(inString);
hash_function = (HashFunc)Oin.readObject();
//set Vote object variables:
current.setId(prime);
current.setVoteFunction(t1);
current.setHash(hash_function);
voteStructures.addElement(current);
//update the users parameters
writeVoteFile();
found.setVotedOnce(true);
writeUsersFile();
outLine ="Voting done successfully.";
}
case PRINTRESULTS:
// user wants to print results
outLine = "The following are the voting results:";
os.println(outLine);
readVoteFile();
…
case VOTEAGAIN:
// User wants to re-vote
Create new Vote object
readVoteFile();
toChange = this.findPrimeVote(id);//find
existing vote
//change the voting strategy
…
toChange.setVoteFunction(hash_vote);
toChange.setHash(hash_function);

an

Step 1: Authentication
1. Voter starts the execution of the client’s side
program.
2. Client asks the user to enter his name.
3. Server’s side application checks if the name exists on
the list of users that are eligible to vote.
4. If the name exists, the user is asked to enter his
password; otherwise the user is considered to be
system’s guest.
5. In case that the user’s name exists, the server checks
if the password matches the user’s name (if the
password does not match, the user is considered to be
the guest).

Step 2: User’s operations
Phase 1 (the time allocated to acknowledge users’
responses with the willingness to vote)
1. Client displays the names of the users that are eligible
to cast a vote.
2. User chooses the option to confirm voting or the
option to exit.
3. If user chooses to confirm voting the server records
user’s willingness to vote.
4. Client displays the “Thank you” message and informs
the user about voting dates.
Phase 2 (the time allocated for the actual voting)
User chooses to vote
1. Server checks (using user’s name and password) if the
user has voted already.
• If the user did not cast his vote yet, the client
randomly generates 25-bit long prime number and
assigns it as an identification number to that
particular voter.
• The message is displayed on the screen asking the
user to take a note of this number and not to reveal it
to anyone.
• Client displays the names of the election candidates,
and asks the user to choose one of them.
• User types in the number of the candidate for whom
he wants to cast the vote.
• Client randomly generates 25-bit long prime number
called voting strategy, such that it meets the
specification to match the first and the last digit with
candidate’s index number (private key requirement).
• Client performs one of the encrypting functions
(called also a voting function; there is a random
choice made to use one of the three available
encrypting methods) on the user’s identification ta g
and the voting strategy number.
• Client displays the voting function to the user. The
user is asked to write the number down and to keep it
confidential.
• Client sends the pair (identification tag, voting
function result) to the server.
• Server stores the vote information in its database

Users

authenticate
refuse connection
[user not recognized]

Candidates

Time/Date

check dates [valid for a
chosen action]

Votes

display candidates
record the vote

return
return/display result

Sequence Diagram for Voting Scenario
Server records that the user voted already. It is done
to prevent the user from casting multiple votes.
• When the user chooses to exit, client disconnects and
the link between user’s name and his vote disappears.
2. If the user previously cast the vote, he is asked to
choose the re-vote option
User chooses to re-vote
1. Client asks the user for his identification tag number.
2. Client asks the user for his voting function.
3. Server checks if the vote exists.
• Client displays the names of the election
candidates, and asks the user to choose one of
them.
• User types in the number of the candidate for
whom he wants to cast the new vote.
Client randomly generates 25-bit long voting strategy
number, such that it meets the specification to match the
first and the last digit with the candidate’s index number
(private key requirement).
• Client performs one of the encrypting functions
(there is a random choice made to use one of the
three available encrypting methods) on the user’s
identification tag and the voting strategy number.
• Client displays the result of voting function to the
user. The user is asked to write the number down
and to keep it confidential.
• Client sends the pair (identification tag, voting
function result) to the server.
• Server stores new vote in its database and erases
the old vote.
•

User chooses to check the votes
1.

Client displays the voting functions for all votes that
were cast. To make it easier for the user to find his

vote, the list of votes is displayed in an ascending
order.
2. User can check if his vote is in the ballot, which
means it was counted.
User chooses to exit
1. Client displays the “Goodbye” message
2. Client disconnects from the server
Phase 3 (after voting deadline)
1. Client displays all the voting functions to the screen.
The votes are displayed in such a way (see below),
that for every candidate the voting function numbers
are displayed in an ascending order. The user can
check if his vote was counted correctly, and the
election candidates can verify the voting results.

7. Conclusions
Voting software cannot be treated in the same way as a
word processor or other applications, as we have even less
reason to blindly trust the vendor – especially when the
whole country’s future is at stake. Most of the recent news
about harnessing electronics for the election process has
been bad.[8] While much work in the USA is aimed at
strengthening the ever-tight security around the software
source code (it has been suggested that the voting
application source code could not be reviewed even if
challenged in court), there is a contrary approach whereby
the voting code is made public, ie released as FLOSS. It is
often argued [e.g. 10], that the only way to have a
trustworthy system is to open the source code of
cryptographic functions to the public. The algorithm can
really be considered secure when is examined by many
experts. “… [t]he only way to have any confidence in an
algorithm's security is to have experts examine it.”[11]

Australian officials believe that elections can benefit from
involving the voters in the software development process.
Perhaps a truly open system can alleviate some of these
issues.[9]The voters can dictate the requirements
including security and functionality of the voting system.
No matter how many election flaws are found, and despite
their severity, electronic voting systems are here to stay
and serve us all. The only question remains: “How much,
or little, trust can we afford?”

[13]The
VEV
software
is
open:
<
http://sourceforge.net/projects/vev >.
[14] AGIMO, A Guide to Open Source Software (2005),
p.10.

User Screens
Authentication
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